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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CITIZENSHIP-POWER OF CONGRESS To 
EFFECT INVOLUNTARY EXPATRIATION-In four recent cases the 
United States Supreme Court has dealt with the power of Con-
gress to effect the denationalization of native-born citizens with-
out their consent. Three cases, Perez v. Brownell/ Trop v. 
Dulles,2 and Mendoza-Martinez v. Jvf.ackey3 dealt with the con-
stitutionality of sections 40l(e), 40l(g) and 40l(j), respectively, 
of the Nationality Act of 1940.4 The fourth case, Nishikawa v. 
Dulles/' dealt only with the burden of proof when duress is al-
leged under section 40l(c), but contained one opinion of con-
stitutional significance. The purpose of this comment is to analyze 
and evaluate these decisions. 
I. THE HOLDINGS 
A. Perez v. Brownell 
Perez v. Brownell involved two subsections of section 401 of 
the Nationality Act of 1940. Those provisions read as follows: 
"A person who is a national of the United States, whether 
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . 
" ( e) voting in a political election in a foreign state or 
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the 
sovereignty over foreign territory; or ... 
"(j) departing from or remaining outside of the juris-
diction of the United States in time of war or during a 
period declared by the President to be a period of national 
emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding training 
and service in the land or naval forces of the United 
States .... " 
Petitioner in the case was born in Texas in 1909 and moved 
to Mexico in 1919 or 1920. He learned in 1928 that he had been 
born in Texas, and knew of his duty in World War II to register 
for the draft but failed to do so. He voted in a political election 
in 1946, apparently for Mexico's president. 
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for Justices Brennan, Burton, 
Clark and Harlan held that subsection ( e) was constitutional 
1 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 
2 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
3 356 U.S. 258 (1958). 
4 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1481, as amended, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. 
V, 1958) §148l(a)(9). 
5 356 U.S. 129 (1958). 
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and that under it petitioner had lost his citizenship. They did 
not pass on the validity of subsection (j). After reviewing statu-
tory and administrative history and international usages, 6 Frank-
furter first argued that Congress has the inherent power to deal 
with foreign affairs as an attribute of sovereignty. He then stated 
that the constitutional test was whether withdrawing citizenship 
bore a reasonable relationship to the regulation of foreign affairs 
and found that included within the foreign affairs power was 
the power to deal with the voting of American citizens in foreign 
elections because such voting might well be a source of embar-
rassment to our government. He argued that a reasonable meth-
od of achieving that end was to divest the voter of citizenship, 
because termination of citizenship terminates the problem, and 
further that it was "not without significance" that Congress had 
found that such conduct involved "elements of an allegiance to 
another country in some measure, at least, inconsistent with 
American citizenship."7 The Fourteenth Amendment was dis-
missed in a footnote.8 Frankfurter finally argued that while 
Mackenzie v. Hare9 and Savorgnan v. United States10 indicate 
that citizenship can be destroyed only for voluntary conduct, 
it is unnecessary for that conduct to evince an intent on the 
part of the citizen to expatriate himself. 
Chief Justice Warren wrote the principal dissenting opinion 
in which Justices Black and Douglas joined. While apparently 
accepting the doctrine of inherent power, he argued that since 
the government derives its power from the consent of the 
governed, it has no power to destroy the relationship that gives 
rise to its existence. He emphasized, however, that a citizen may 
voluntarily expatriate himself and that the constitutional test 
for questioning the subsection's validity was therefore "whether 
the conduct it describes invariably involves a dilution of un-
divided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment 
of citizenship."11 Under this test he found the statute inade-
quate because the election might be a relatively insignificant 
one or because the voting might have been legal in the foreign 
country. Mackenzie v. Hare was distinguished as involving only 
6 His historical survey went no further back, however, than 1868. 
7 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 61 (1958). 
s Id. at 58, note 3. 
9 239 U.S. 299 (1915). 
10 338 U.S. 491 (1950). 
11 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 75 (1958). 
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a suspension of citizenship during coverture, and both that case 
and Savorgnan v. United States were distinguished as meeting 
the test the Chief Justice proposed, since in both the citizen 
acquired another allegiance. 
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented, arguing 
that while the Fourteenth Amendment absolutely granted citi-
zenship to one born here, no power is found in the Constitution 
to destroy that citizenship. He emphasized that both Mackenzie 
and Savorgnan involved the acquisition of another citizenship, 
and would place citizenship in the constitutionally preferred 
position he presently feels First Amendment freedoms occupy 
since "it is a grant absolute in terms." 
Justice Whittaker in a "memorandum" expressly accepted 
the premise of Frankfurter's opinion, but argued that since the 
voting could have been legal in Mexico, it bore no rational 
nexus to embarrassment of foreign affairs or to a dilution of 
allegiance to this country. 
B. Trop v. Dulles 
Trop v. Dulles involved subsection (g): 
". . . deserting the military or naval forces of the United 
States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by 
court martial and as the result of such conviction is dis-
missed or dishonorably discharged from the service of such 
military, air, or naval forces .... " 
Petitioner had deserted for one day in 1944 while serving 
in the Army in Morocco. He had voluntarily turned himself in 
and had not deserted to the enemy. Chief Justice Warren wrote 
the principal opinion, speaking for Justices Black, Douglas and 
Whittaker. The Chief Justice first reaffirmed his argument in 
Perez, and would find this statute unconstitutional for, since 
desertion to the enemy was not involved, the conduct showed no 
dilution of allegiance_ to this country. As a second ground for 
his opinion, Warren argued that the statute was penal in charac-
ter, and after assuming that it bore a rational relationship to 
the congressional exercise of the war power, found that it was 
a "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment.12 
12 U.S. CONST., Amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 
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Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred, arguing 
that in any case citizenship could not be divested on the finding 
of a military tribunal. 
Justice Brennan concurred separately and it was his shift 
which caused subsection (e) to be upheld while subsection (g) 
was struck down. He argued that there was no rational connec-
tion between the war power and expatriation following deser-
tion within the Perez test. He found first that denationalization 
for desertion was a penal clause, second that it did not aid in 
rehabilitating the prisoner, third that it did not deter desertion 
since it was a less strong sanction than the death penalty which 
could be imposed for desertion and fourth that it was irrational 
since some technical desertions bear no reiation to conduct even 
faintly disloyal. 
Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Burton, 
Clark and Harlan: Frankfurter first argued that the subsection 
bore a rational relationship to the war power, and that Congress 
could have supposed that it would help military commanders 
maintain discipline and morale. Frankfurter then argued that 
this was a "non-penal" purpose, but that even assuming arguendo 
that it was punishment, the Eighth Amendment was not trans-
gressed since it could not be "seriously urged that loss of citizen-
ship is a fate worse than death,"13 a punishment which could 
clearly be applied to a deserter. 
C. Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey 
Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey involved subsection G) pre-
viously quoted which was left open in Perez. In this case peti-
tioner left the United States in 1942 apparently for the purpose 
of avoiding the draft, and did not return until 1946. Upon his 
return he was convicted of draft evasion.14 Petitioner brought an 
action for a declaratory judgment that he was a citizen. The 
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion vacated the judgment 
against him and "remanded [the cause] to the United States 
District Court for determination in light of Trop v. Dulles . ... "15 
13 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 125 (1958). 
14 54 Stat. 894 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §462. See Mendoza-Martinez 
v. Mackey, (9th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 239. 
lei Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey, 356 U.S. 258 (1958). 
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D. Nishikawa v. Dulles 
In Nishikawa v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for 
Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas and Whittaker, held that when 
duress is raised as a defense under section 40l(c), which includes 
". . . entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state 
unless expressly authorized by the laws of the United States, 
if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state ... ," 
the government has the burden of proving that the petitioner 
acted voluntarily. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Burton, 
concurred separately and would limit the holding to cases where 
the petitioner was inducted by command of a penal statute. 
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, dissented, arguing that 
the one alleging duress should have the burden of proving it, 
particularly when as here the facts were almost exclusively with 
the knowledge of petitioner. 
The opinion in that case of interest in this inquiry was a 
concurring opinion of Justice Black in which Justice Douglas 
joined. Black argued that Congress had no power to destroy 
citizenship, whether for acts bearing a rational nexus to some 
substantive power or for acts showing a transfer of allegiance. 
In his view the question was always whether an individual him-
self intended to relinquish his citizenship, and Congress could 
do no more than establish rebuttable presumptions that certain 
acts evidenced that intent. To the extent that they held to the 
contrary, Mackenzie v. Hare and Savorgnan v. United States 
should be overruled. 
E. Con-fl,ict of Judicial Philosophy 
Throughout the cases ran a thread of disagreement as to 
the basic policy the Court should follow in reviewing acts of 
Congress.16 Frankfurter continuously advocated a policy of judi-
cial restraint in the Holmesian tradition: "The awesome power 
16 Compare Frankfurter's opinion in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 62: "To deny 
the power of Congress to enact the legislation challenged here would be to disregard 
the constitutional allocation of governmental functions that it is this Court's solemn 
duty to guard" with Douglas' dissent (at 79): "The philosophy of the opinion that sustains 
this statute is foreign to our constitutional system," and Black's concurrence in Nishikawa 
v. Dulles, note 5 supra, at 139: "In my view the notion that citizenship can be snatched 
away whenever such deprivation bears some 'rational nexus' to the implementation of 
a power granted Congress by the Constitution is a dangerous and frightening proposition." 
To the effect that some caustic asides accompanied the delivery of the opinions, see 
N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1958, p. 17:2. 
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of this Court to invalidate such legislation, because in practice 
it is bounded only by our own prudence in discerning the limits 
of the Court's constitutional function, must be exercised with 
the utmost restraint."17 Warren, on the other hand, asserted the 
Court's power and responsibility to enforce the Constitution's 
prohibitions as it understood them: "Courts must not consider 
the wisdom of statutes but neither can they sanction as being 
merely unwise that which the Constitution forbids .... When the 
Government acts to take away the fundamental right of citizen-
ship, the safeguards of the Constitution should be examined with 
special diligence."18 
IL RELEVANT HISTORY19 
In the view of early English common law, allegiance was 
indissoluble even with the consent of the sovereign. The citizen 
was born with a tie to his government that only an act of Parlia-
ment could destroy.20 Voluntary expatriation was an unknown 
concept. As a concomitant of a citizen's duty to his country, 
however, was the concept of the sovereign's duty to the citizen, 
apparently developed in this country as a justification and ex-
planation for the Declaration of Independence and the Revolu-
tionary War.21 Thus it was argued that the English Government, 
by its illiberal conduct toward its colonies, had forfeited the 
right to have their perpetual allegiance. 
After the Revolution, there developed a decided split in 
American thinking. One group, led by Thomas Jefferson and 
with the American Revolution immediately before them, argued 
that voluntary expatriation was a natural right, and that the 
colonists in rebelling from the English despotism had merely 
exercised it. Thus Jefferson was apparently the drafter of the 
Virginia legislation which first gave a right ( or expressed a mode 
for its exercise) to a state citizen to expatriate.22 
His view was met with considerable opposition, however, 
17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 128 (1958). 
1s Id. at 103. 
19 That historical ,background which bears on the constitutional question has been 
emphasized. For a general discussion, see the authorities cited in notes 20, 21, 23, 25, 
44, 48, 50 and 58 infra. 
20 COCKBURN, NATIONALITY 63, 64 (1869); Slaymaker, "The Right of the American 
Citizen to Expatriate," 37 AM. L. REv. 191 at 192, 193 (1903). 
21 Dutcher, "The Right of Expatriation," 11 AM. L. R.Ev. 447 at 448-451 (1877). 
22 See TSIANG, EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 26 (1942). 
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from, as might be expected, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton 
argued that the Jefferson doctrine was "an altogether new inven-
tion unknown and inadmissible in law."23 Quite naturally, since 
most states had adopted the common law of England and since it 
did not provide for voluntary expatriation, it was thought that 
Jefferson's doctrine was not a part of our law. Judicial decisions 
as they developed were in some conflict although they generally 
supported the more conservative views of Hamilton.24 
The adoption of the Constitution brought with it one other 
problem, not ultimately settled until the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment: was there a separate United States citizen-
ship or was it merely derivative from state citizenship?25 The 
feeling that citizenship was predominately a state matter was 
partially responsible for the defeat of one of the first attempts to 
pass a federal statute detailing a mode for exercising the right 
of voluntary expatriation.26 
This brief examination of early historical attitudes is im-
portant to our problem not for the controversies that were in-
volved, but for those that were not involved. That is, at the 
time of adoption of the Constitution, the right or power of the 
government to effect involuntary expatriation was not a burning 
issue, or even an issue at all. The problem simply was not raised, 
presumably because no one at that time thought that the govern-
ment should or did have the power to divest a citizen of his citizen-
ship.27 Therefore, to the extent which a thing not considered 
can be said to have been permitted or denied by the Constitu-
23 Quoted in Morrow, "The Early American Attitude Toward the Doctrine of Ex-
patriation," 26 AM. J. INT. L. 552 at 554 (1932). 
24 Sec cases discussed in Slaymaker, "The Right of the American Citizen to Ex-
patriate," 37 AM. L. R.Ev. 191 (1903). 
25 See ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (1949). 
26 Roche, "Loss of American Nationality: The Years of Confusion," 4 WEST. PoL. Q. 
268 at 276 (1951). 
27 Thus, in the 1818 debates discussed in the text infra, Anderson of Kentucky 
argued: "Although •the intention with which [the bill to provide a means of exercising 
the right of voluntary expatriation] was introduced, and the title of the bill declare 
that it is to insure and foster the right of the citizen, the direct and inevitable effect of 
the bill, is an assumption of power by Congress to declare that certain Acts when com-
mitted shall amount to a renunciation of citizenship." 1 ANNALS OF CoNG., 15th Cong., 
1st sess., p. 1039 (1818). Lowndes of South Carolina argued similarly: "If yon pass this 
bill, said he, you have only one step further to go, and say that such and such acts shall 
be considered as presumption of the intention of the citizen to expatriate, and thus take 
from him the privileges of a citizen." Id. at 1050. The supporters of the measure clearly 
had no such intention, and Cobb of Georgia answered Lowndes' argument: "It is to 
remove any difficulties arising from such presumption, that this law is introduced." Id. 
at 1068. 
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tion, it is arguable that the power to cause forfeiture of citizen-
ship was denied. 
Apparently the first thorough28 consideration of the power 
of Congress to effect expatriation was in the House debates sur-
rounding the attempt in 1818 to adopt the federal measure 
previously mentioned detailing a method for exercising the 
right of voluntary expatriation.29 Although the measure had the 
support of several representatives, and most apparently favored 
the right itself, many felt that even its modest terms exceeded 
the constitutional power of Congress. Thus Pindall of Virginia 
argued: "The power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization 
cannot be made to comprehend the power to change the law 
of expatriation."30 Lowndes of South Carolina expressed a simi-
lar sentiment: "[I]f the Constitution had intended to give to 
Congress so delicate a power, it would have been expressly 
granted,"31 as did McLane of Delaware: "It will not be contended 
that the power in question is expressly given; . . . and . . . it is 
not necessary to the execution of any express power."32 Abbott 
of Georgia argued to the same effect: "The people have delegated 
no power to Congress to define a rule for expatriation."33 Wil-
liams of North Carolina also felt the act would be unconstitu-
tional: "The framers of the Constitution would also have found 
inseparable objections, against the exercise of this power by 
Congress, from the nature of our political institutions,"34 and 
he emphasized that citizenship was essentially a state concern. 
Cobb of Georgia, however, thought the act constitutionally sup-
portable: "In my opinion, it is clearly incidental to the power 
28 But see TsIANG, EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 37-43 (1942) for a 
discussion of two previous House debates. 
29 "That, whensoever any citizen of the United States shall, by a declaration in 
writing, made and executed in the district court of the United States, within the state 
where he resides, in open court, to be •by said court entered of record, declare that he 
relinquishes the character of a citizen, and shall depart out of the United States, such 
person shall, from the time of his departure, be considered as having exercised his right 
of expatriation, and shall thenceforth be considered no citizen." I ANNALS OF CoNG., 
15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1054 (1818). The statute, it will be seen, assumed a "right of 
expatriation," and was concerned merely with providing a means of exercising it. 
30 I ANNALS OF CONG., 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1045 (1818). Anderson of Kentucky 
argued that the existence of a power to naturalize "furnishes evidence, negatively, that 
[the power to prescribe a manner of expatriation] was omitted from design, and not from 
inattention." Id. at 1037. 
31 Id. at 1050. 
32 Id. at 1057. 
33 Id. at 1087. 
84 Id. at 1079. 
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of establishing 'an uniform rule of naturalization.' It necessarily 
results from it-it is, indeed, a correlative power.''35 Johnson of 
Kentucky also appeared to support the constitutionality of the 
measure.36 After being amended several times the act was ulti-
mately defeated. In commenting on these debates, Tsiang, whose 
book makes a significant contribution in this area, observed: 
"In the course of debate and maneuvering it became evi-
dent that most of the speakers were in favor of allowing 
expatriation, though they also felt that Congress had not 
been delegated the power to act on the matter and that 
federal regulation would infringe upon states' rights. At 
first, the trend of the voting was toward acceptance of the 
proposed principle. The entire proposal was dropped only 
after the majority of the House became convinced that the 
measure was definitely unconstitutional.''37 
These debates must be viewed with caution. The makeup 
of the House in 1818 certainly was not identical with the make-
up of the Constitutional Convention. In our system it is generally 
considered that the courts rather than the legislature determine 
the meaning of our fundamental law. The debates were held 
at a time when principles of constitutional construction were 
much stricter than they have evolved to be. Nevertheless they 
should not be disregarded, particularly since all parts of the 
Constitution which could be alleged to give Congress the power 
to denationalize were then in existence. Moreover the constitu-
tional doubts were expressed as to providing a means for effect-
ing voluntary expatriation and would presumably have been far 
greater if the legislation had concerned forfeiture.38 Finally, 
representatives in 1817 probably were not completely out of 
touch with the frame of reference of those who drafted the 
Constitution. 
The view that the power to prescribe uniform rules for 
naturalization did not give Congress the power to effect expatria-
tion was given powerful support by Chief Justice Marshall's 
dictum in 1824 in Osborn v. Bank of the United States: 
"He [the naturalized citizen] becomes a member of the 
society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and 
35 Id. at 1067. 
36 Id. at 1043. 
37 TSIANG, ExPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 60-61 (1942). See also note 26 
supra. 
38 See note 27 supra. 
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standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of 
a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to 
enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the 
national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of 
naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, 
so far as respects the individual."39 
Of course the statement was mere dictum, but in the emphasized 
portions the Chief Justice seemed to assume that the power to 
abridge the rights of citizens, if one existed, must be implied 
from the power to naturalize, but that no such implication could 
be drawn from that power.40 
The question whether a right of voluntary expatriation existed 
in a United States citizen continued as previously indicated. 
Courts generally tended to deny the right (the federal courts 
usually on ambiguous grounds) and administrative practice vacil-
lated.41 A strong position was taken by Buchanan in the 1840's 
while secretary of state, although abandoned by succeeding sec-
retaries. It was reasserted when Buchanan became president,42 
with an opinion of Attorney General Black in the case of Chris-
tian Ernst being particularly notable.43 The position was not 
vigorously asserted during the civil war, primarily because we 
were in the position other countries had previously been in, 
that of asking for the return of our citizens who had sought 
refuge from our draft laws in another country.44 Following the 
war, however, a controversy concerning the imprisonment by 
Britain of former Irish citizens who had been naturalized ensued 
and the result was the passage in 1868 of an act which declared 
that it is a "fundamental principle of the Republic" that "the 
right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all 
people."45 Whether this act had any legal effect is at least ques-
tionable,46 although some courts apparently applied it,47 but 
39 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 at 827 (1824). Emphasis added. 
40 But see 64 YALE L. J. 1164 at 1184 (1955). 
41 See note 24 supra; generally Flournoy, "Naturalization and Expatriation," 31 YALE 
L. J. 702 (1922). 
42 See generally Moore, "The Doctrine of Expatriation," 110 HARP. Mo. MAG. 225 
(1905). 
43 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 356 at 357, 358 (1859). 
44 TS!ANG, EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 83, 84 (1942); Moore, "The 
Doctrine of Expatriation," 110 HARP. Mo. MAG. 225 at 230, 231 (1905). 
45 15 Stat. 223 (1868). 
46 Dutcher, "The Right of Expatriation," 11 AM. L. R.Ev. 447 at 474-476 (1877). 
47 E.g., In re Look Tin Sing, (C.C. Calif. 1884) 21 F. 905 (dictum). 
1152 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 56 
its main usefulness was in furnishing the basis for secunng 
treaties with foreign countries in which a reciprocal right of 
expatriation was recognized.48 It should be emphasized that its 
thrust was only to recognize the long-disputed right of a citizen 
voluntarily to expatriate himself, although the methods by which 
he might do so were not defined. 
Just prior to this, in 1865, Congress, partly in response to 
the dilemma mentioned above of asserting a claim to our citizens 
who were avoiding our draft while denying ¢.e claim of other 
governments to their citizens who had become naturalized in 
this country for evading military service in their native country, 
and partly in response to a general feeling of revulsion to those 
Americans who refused to do their military duty,49 passed an 
act providing for the forfeiture of the "rights of citizenship"50 
of persons who deserted beyond the borders of the United 
States.51 The act apparently was one primarily of expediency and 
received no serious constitutional attention. 
About this same time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed 
providing that " [ a ]II persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States ... ,"52 Thus a personal status, that of citizenship, 
was conferred by a constitutional grant. At least two questions 
arise from this clause: whether it by implication permits Con-
gress to destroy citizenship obtained through its operation, and 
whether it by implication prohibits Congress from destroying 
citizenship under -other powers it might have. Frankfurter ap-
parently answered the latter question in the negative by dismiss-
ing it in a footnote in Perez.53 The first, however, was answered 
adversely to congressional power in United States v. Wong Kim 
Ark. There the Court said: 
"The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the 
Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power 
to take it away. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment, while it 
48 Borchard, "Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation," 25 
AM. J. INT. L. 312 (1931). 
49 Note 44 supra. 
50 See discussion of this term in Roche, "The Loss of American Nationality-The 
Development of Statutory Expatriation," 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 25 at 61, 62 (1950). Compare, 
in a different statutory context, In re Watson's Repatriation, (E.D. III. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 
163, with In re Shee Mui Chong Yuen's Repatriation, (D.C. Hawaii 1944) 73 F. Supp. 12. 
51 13 Stat. 490 (1865). 
52 U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV. 
53 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 58, note 3 (1958). 
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leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regu-
late naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Con-
gress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitu-
tion to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizen-
ship. "54 
If, as was implied in Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in Osborn/'5 
which was quoted by the Court in Wong Kim Ark, the only 
power to denationalize must be derived from the power to nat-
uralize, then the quoted statement also answers the second ques-
tion contrary to the answer given by Justice Frankfurter. This 
follows because if the only basis for authority prior to the Four-
teenth Amendment lay in the power to naturalize, and none lay 
there, and the Fourteenth Amendment granted none, then none 
exists. The question whether the above-quoted .statement from 
Wong Kim Ark was dictum therefore becomes quite important 
and the commentators are divided.56 The case involved the citizen-
ship status of a Chinese person born in this country and the prin-
cipal argument was that he was not "subject to the jurisdiction" 
of this country. A subsidiary point was raised that the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts and a treaty with China had made Chinese not 
subject to naturalization, thus excluding them from the operation 
of the amendment. The Court held generally that "subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof" meant no more than subject to the laws 
of this country, and that appellee was subject to our laws when 
born, but answered the latter argument also in the omitted por-
tion of the previously quoted excerpt: 
"Congress having no power to abridge the rights con-
ferred by the Constitution upon those who have become nat-
uralized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori no 
act or omission of Congress, as to providing for the nat-
uralization of parents or children of a particular race, can 
affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the 
Constitution itself, without any aid of legislation."57 
Therefore, the arguments run either that the basic holding 
mooted the other question, making an expression of opinion on 
54 169 U.S. 649 at 703 (1898). 
55 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824). 
56 Compare Hurst, "Can Congress Take Away Citizenship?" 29 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 
62 at 78, 79 (1956) (holding), with 21 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 59 at 63 (1952), and Roche, "The 
Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory Expatriation," 99 UNIV. 
PA. L. REv. 25 at 26, 27 (1950) (dictum). 
57 Note 54 supra. 
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it mere dictum, or that the latter argument was necessary to 
refute the contention that Congress had by statute taken a group, 
i.e., the Chinese, out from under the normal operation of the 
first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Which of these con-
tentions is accepted would seem to depend on whether or not the 
claim that a later statute can destroy an expressly granted con-
s~itutional status is considered wholly frivolous. Since in essence 
Perez held that a later statute had precisely that effect, apparently 
it cannot be considered frivolous, with the result that the two 
quoted statements must be considered necessary to the opinion 
and must be considered overruled sub silento by Perez. The only 
thing that can be said with certainty is that the Fourteenth 
Amendment problem deserved more than a footnote reference 
in the majority opinion. 
Following the two statutes and the constitutional amend-
ment passed in the 1860's, the administrative branch of the 
government found itself deciding cases on an ad hoc basis with 
virtually no guidance from Congress.58 Finally, following an 
extensive study of the problem by three representatives of the 
state department,59 the Act of March 2, 1907 resulted.60 In the 
act in relation to native-born citizens, Congress provided: "That 
any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself 
when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity 
with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any 
foreign state."61 This provision seems merely to provide a meth-
od which a citizen desiring to expatriate himself may use to do 
so, and fills the-vacuum left by the 1868 act. The Report of the 
Sta~e Department confirms this suggestion. 62 
Only one other provision related to loss of citizenship by a 
native-born citizen, section 3 of the act: 
" ... That any American woman who marries a foreigner 
shall take the nationality of her husband. At the termination 
of the marital relation she may resume her American citizen-
ship, if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within 
one year with a consul of the United States, or by returning 
58 See Flournoy, "Naturalization and Expatriation," 31 YALE L. J. 702 and 848 (1922); 
Roche, "Loss of American Nationality: The Years of Confusion," 4 WEST. PoL. Q. 268 
at 287 et seq. (1951). 
59 H.R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess. (1906). 
60 34 Stat. 1228 (1907). 
61 Id., §2. 
62 H.R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess., p. 23 (1906). 
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to reside in the United States, or, if residing in the United 
States at the termination of the marital relation, by continu-
ing to reside therein."63 
It will be noted that, unlike the other section quoted, there is 
no mention of expatriation. Further, section 3 speaks in terms 
of resuming her citizenship, which appears to indicate that it 
was held in abeyance, so to speak, during coverture. This is 
made clear by the State Department report which did not con-
sider this question under the heading "Expatriation" as the 
previous section quoted was, but under the heading, "Effect of 
Naturalization Upon .Status of Wife and Minor Children."64 
Further the initial sentence of the first recommendation under 
this heading stated "[t]hat an American woman who marries a 
foreigner shall take during coverture the nationality of her hus-
band .... "65 Finally, it should be noted that the statute is non-
sense from the point of view of international law, for certainly 
as to other states, American law cannot decree that a woman 
"shall take the nationality of her husband." Only the laws of 
the state of which the husband is a citizen can do that.66 The 
phraseology of the statute, however, undoubtedly disguised the 
possible result under its operation-that of turning American 
citizens while coverture lasted into virtually stateless persons. 
That statute came before the Supreme Court in 1915 in 
Mackenzie v. Hare.61 Mrs. Mackenzie was a native-born citizen 
who married an alien and continued to live in the United States. 
She was refused the right to vote by the Board of Election Com-
missioners of San Francisco and brought a ·writ of mandamus 
to compel it to register her. The court affirmed denial of the writ. 
After stating in dictum that the government may have inherent 
power to deal with foreign states, a power under which Mrs. 
Mackenzie's status could be regulated, the Court said: 
"There need be no dissent from the cases cited by plain-
tiff [Osborn and Wong Kim Ark, among others]; there 
need be no assertion of very extensive power over the right 
of citizenship or of the imperative imposition of conditions 
63 Note 60 supra. 
64 See H.R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 23, 29 (1906). 
65 Id. at 29. Emphasis added. 
66 See the argument of Williams of North Carolina in the 1818 debates, 1 ANNALS OF 
CONG., 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1084 (1818). 
67 239 U.S. 299 (1915). 
1156 MICHIGAN. LAw REvmw [ Vol. 56 
upon it. It may be conceded that change of citizenship can-
nof be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the 
concurrence of the citizen."68 
The Court then held that in view of the historical unity of man 
and wife, that after her voluntary acceptance of his · citizenship 
by her marriage, that "as long as the relation lasts it is made 
tantamount. to expatriation." (Emphasis supplied.) The empha-
sized portions of the sentence support the construction of the 
act previously ~uggested. 
What does the opinion mean in relation to the principal 
cases? It- probably is not a controlling precedent, for carefully 
read in conjunction with the statute, it does not involve full 
expatriation. Apparently a residuum of citizenship must re-
main even during marriage, for citizenship in the case of a widow 
living in the United States is resumed by doing nothing at all. 
Chief Justice Warren therefore seems to be correct in his read-
ing of the actual holding of the case.69 Justice Frankfurter, how-
ever, is also surely right when he suggests that the case stands for 
the proposition that citizenship can be affected by acts which 
are not intended to affect American citizenship. Black tacitly 
recognizes this when he suggests in his dissent in Nishikawa 
that Mackenzie must be overruled if his thesis that citizenship 
must always turn on the intent of the individual is to prevail. 
Nevertheless, since British citizenship was acquired by the mar-
riage under the Naturalization Act, 1870, section 10(1),70 the 
case also supports Warren's thesis that the act must indicate 
"derogation of undivided allegiance ... " before citizenship may 
be affected. It would seem therefore that it was not determina-
tive of the recent cases; it did not involve true involuntary ex-
patriation, and in any case its holding can be used to support the 
thesis of either the majority or minority. 
No significant further legislative activity occurred until 1940 
when Congress made a sweeping revision of the nationality laws 
generally. In the Nationality Act of 1940, with the possible ex-
ception of the ambiguous 1865 act involving the loss of "rights 
of citizenship" for desertion, Congress provided for involuntary 
complete loss of citizenship for the first time. The act is presently 
68 Id. at 311. 
69 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 69-73 (1958). 
70 33 Viet., c. 14. See VAN Prrnus, NATIONALITY WITHIN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 
OF NATIONS 81-83 (1930). 
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recodified m the Imm1gration and Nationality Act of 1952.71 
Before returning to the recent cases under consideration, 
brief mention must be made of Savorgnan · v. United States.72 
In that case a native-born woman, wishing to marry an Italian 
diplomatic official, signed a paper written in Italian, which she 
did not understand, but which contained both a renunciation 
of United States citizenship and an acquisition of Italian citizen-
ship. Without deciding whether the 1907 or the 1940 act gov-
erned, the Court held that she had been expatriated. She ap-
parently did not intend to lose her American citizenship, but did 
know that the document concerned citizenship and that she 
was acquiring Italian citizenship. This case then would also sup-
port the positions of both Frankfurter and Warren-the woman 
did not subjectively intend to lose her citizenship, but her vol-
untary act in acquiring Italian citizenship indicated a transfer 
of allegiance. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT CASES 
A. Inherent Power 
Neither of the cases, Mackenzie and United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,73 cited to sustain the proposition that the 
government has inherent power as an attribute of sovereignty 
to deal with foreign affairs, directly supports that proposition. 
As previously indicated, the statements in Mackenzie to that 
effect were clearly dictum. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Suther-
land's argument generally went, not to proving that the g01.1ern-
ment had inherent power, but that the President had inherent 
power and exercised a broad discretion in the matter of foreign 
affairs.74 Moreover, the holding is not consistent with the con-
ventional doctrine that ours is a federal government of delegated 
powers.75 
Nevertheless the inherent power argument had been accepted 
71 Note 4 supra. 
72 338 U.S. 491 (1950). 
73 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
74 See Riesenfeld, "The Power of Congress and the President in International Rela-
tions: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions," 25 CALIF. L. REv. 643 at 665-669 (1937); 
generally PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND 221-232 (1951) and SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME 
CoURT 81-86 (1957). Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 at 295 (1936). 
75 Compare Patterson, "In re the United States v. the Curtiss-Wright Corporation," 
22 TEX. L. ~• 286, 445 (1944), with CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, 4th ed., 170-175 (1957). 
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by a majority of the Court even before Mackenzie was decided76 
and has been referred to in several cases since then.77 In Perez 
it was expressly accepted as the basis for the decision by a five-
justice majority, and Warren, speaking for the minority, ap-
peared also to accept the doctrine: "Generally, when congres-
sional action is challenged, constitutional authority is found in 
the express and implied powers with which the National Govern-
ment has been invested or in those inherent powers that are 
necessary attributes of a sovereign state."18 Therefore, if the 
question ever was in doubt, Perez clearly settles that the in-
herent power doctrine is firmly established in our constitutional· 
law. As international relations become more complex, the doc-
trine may have an increasingly important role to play. 
B. Majority and Minority Approaches Contrasted 
Frankfurter's approach in Perez was essentially as follows: 
Congress has inherent power to control foreign relations; that 
power includes the right to regulate citizens voting in foreign 
elections because such political activities may cause embar-
rassment to our government; expatriation bears a "rational 
nexus" to solving this problem since the voter ceases to be a citi-
zen after he votes and the United States can thus disclaim his 
activities. If this approach is accepted, does the analysis stand 
up?-Under the act the expatriating act is voting; it is not political 
activity. Speech-making, electioneering, bribery, and all other 
sorts of intermeddling will not cause loss of citizenship because 
the statute has not so provided.79 Since Mexico has adopted the 
secret ballot, 80 the question then must turn not on the candidate 
or political party supported, but on the naked fact that a ballot 
was cast. Finally, since in expatriation questions the government 
76 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 at 711-713 (1893). See also Clayton, 
"The Evolution and Basis of Our Nationality," 24 N.J.L.J. 579 (1901). But see Quarles, 
"The Federal Government: As to Foreign Affairs, Are Its Powers Inherent as Distinguished 
From Delegated," 32 GEO. L.J. 375 at 381 (1944). 
77 See discussion of the cases in Hurst, "Can Congress Take Away Citizenship?" 29 
ROCKY .MT. L. REV. 62 at 67-72 (1956). 
78 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 63 (1958). Emphasis added. 
79 Were it so to provide, an interesting First Amendment problem would be raised. 
While it may be presumed that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to 
speak freely anywhere, and while voting itself may not be speech, it is arguable that 
sanctions could not be imposed in this country by our laws for speech in other countries 
which would ,be protected by the First Amendment if delivered here. 
80 See Ley Electoral Federal, Capitulo VII, Seccion Segunda, Articulo 84 II, 189 DIARio 
OFICIAL, Dec. 4, 1951, p. 11. · 
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has the burden of proof, 81 and since it put in no evidence on the 
legality of petitioner's voting in Mexico, he would apparently 
be entitled to assume for constitutional purposes that his voting 
was authorized by Mexican law.82 The constitutional question 
then is: does the fact of casting a ballot in a Mexican election 
when permitted by Mexican law pose a sufficiently serious prob-
lem of embarrassment to our government to justify Congress 
in determining that there is a rational nexus between expatriat-
ing the voter and the successful conduct of foreign policy? If 
Mexico by her law gives an American the right to vote, it is 
difficult to suppose a rational objection based solely on the exer-
cise of the right so given. If it is argued that Mexico might 
irrationally object, a sufficient answer would seem to be that 
Americans should not lose their citizenship because of the ir-
rational conduct of foreign governments, and that it would be 
irrational of Congress so to provide. Perhaps little else can 
be said.83 
Unlike Black's concurrence in Nishikawa, the Warren ap-
proach in Perez also seems to involve a "rational nexus" test, 
directed however to an entirely different question. For Warren 
the test would seem to be whether the congressional act bore 
a reasonable relationship to a transfer of allegiance from this 
81 Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955). 
82 This, however, is not true. The Mexican Constitution provides: "Art. 35. The 
prerogatives of citizens are: (1) To vote at popular elections; ... " [Emphasis supplied.] 
Art. 33. . .. "No alien may meddle in any way whatsoever in the political affairs of 
the country." 2 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, 2d ed., 675 (1956). Although neither 
the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals, (9th Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 364, indicated 
the parentage of petitioner, Clemente Martinez Perez, it is possible that his parents 
were Mexican nationals. Were that true, he would also be of Mexican nationality 
since Article 30 of the Mexican Constitution provides: "(A) The following are Mexican 
by birth: ••. (II) Children born in foreign countries of Mexican parents; of Mexican 
father and alien mother; of Mexican mother and unknown father." PEASLEE at 674. Thus 
Perez would be a dual national. The constitutional question would therefore be sub-
stantially different. The exercise of political rights in a country in which petitioner 
was already a citizen could indicate an acceptance of his obligations of citizenship in 
that country inconsistent with continued allegiance to the United States within the 
Warren test. Moreover, problems of statelessness would not be present. See note 104 infra. 
83 Apparently the participation in the Saar plebiscite by German citizens who had 
become naturalized Americans was the motivating force behind §40l(e). Perez v. Brownell, 
356 U.S. 44 at 54. The House Report in which the section was originally (though un-
successfully) proposed, however, revealed no embarrassment to our foreign relations by 
suclr voting, but only a somewhat querulous objection that suclr conduct was improper. 
H. Rep. 216, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935). The Report was implicitly directed at dual 
nationals, in any case. The plebiscite might represent a situation, however, when voting 
permitted to our citizens by Germany would embarrass our foreign relations, although 
with France rather than with Germany. 
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country. For example, he would probably uphold a statute pro-
viding for loss of citizenship· for voting in a foreign election in 
which only citizens of that country could vote, at least if the 
voter knew of this law, for his act would then indicate an al-
legiance to that country inconsistent with United States citizen-
ship.84 The fact that the individual was subjectively completely 
loyal to this country would be irrelevent. 
Despite this superficial similarity of approach the two tests 
rest on basically differing philosophies. For Frankfurter expa-
triation is merely one of a number of techniques available to 
Congress for regulating or controlling or implementing any 
of the many substantive powers which it possesses. Thus Con-
gress may grant licenses, or provide a federal forum in which 
to litigate, or expatriate, or set up an investigative committee, 
if it feels that the chosen technique would implement its policy 
in an area in which it has power. The Fourteenth Amendment 
and Marshall's interpretation of the naturalization clause be-
come relatively irrelevant, for the question is not one of sub-
stantive power, but of whether a regulatory technique is ap-
propriate to its end. 
Warren on the other hand sees expatriation as a substan-
tive subject for legislation, such as bankruptcy, and for which 
a specific grant of power must be found. Since use of the nat-
uralization power and the Fourteenth Amendment, the only 
readily available clauses from which the substantive power to 
effect expatriation might be implied, has been foreclosed by 
Osborn and Wong Kim Ark, he understandably can find permis-
sion to legislate in the area only from the somewhat fictitious 
concept that by providing forfeiture of citizenship for acts 
normally evidencing lack of allegiance, Congress is only recog-
nizing the legal effect of the citizen's own voluntary renunciation. 
Working from his premises, he is therefore allowing Congress 
considerable discretion,85 despite Frankfurter's charges of judi-
cial intervention. 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment 
While the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment has al-
ready been substantially discussed, one more comment might 
84 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 75 (1958). 
85 Compare Black's approach in Nishikawa, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). 
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be pertinent. The question ultimately is whether the creation 
of a status in absolute terms also carries with it the implication 
that the status so created shall not be destroyed. The rest of the 
Constitution does not seem to provide any other particularly 
useful analogy. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "All persons 
born ... in the United States ... are citizens of the United 
States .... " It could undoubtedly be argued that after the deci-
sion in Perez, Perez was a person born in the United States who, 
by congressional mandate, was no longer a citizen of the United 
States, and that this was in violation of the express terms of the 
amendment. On the other hand, it could be countered that the 
amendment merely made clear a person's status when he was 
"born," and was intended to have no other effect. Apparently all 
would agree that either formulation would include an exception 
for truly voluntary expatriation. The question then, if viewed in 
this light, is whether the amendment has continuing application 
to the person, or whether it operates once at the moment of 
birth, and then is spent. The difficulty, of course, is that the 
amendment was drafted primarily (1) to make the newly liber-
ated Negroes into citizens and (2) to make it clear that citizen-
ship was primarily a federal matter.86 The problem of expatria-
tion was apparently not considered. 
D. Whittaker's Position 
Justice Whittaker's position is somewhat difficult to assess. 
In his Memorandum in Perez he expressly accepted the Frank-
furter approach. Yet he also joined without qualification the 
Warren opinion in Trop in which Warren reasserted his thesis 
advanced in Perez. Further, although accepting the Frankfurter 
approach in Perez, he dissented because he felt that since voting 
in Mexican elections might be legal, such voting bore no rational 
relationship either to the embarrassment of foreign relations or 
to dilution of loyalty. The lack of relation to the latter is clear, 
and Warren also made this point. The lack of relation to the 
former is not so clear. Brennan advanced the argument in his 
concurring opinion in Trap that one evil of foreign voting was 
that it might be taken as a representation of United States poli-
cy.87 If this is a major ground for finding embarrassment, it 
86 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 at 73 (1872). 
87 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 106 (1958). 
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could be argued that we could disclaim illegal political activity 
with greater ease than we could disclaim legal activity.88 Thus, 
Whittaker's distinction, while clearly supporting the Warren 
rationale, does not so clearly support the Frankfurter rationale 
which he purports to accept, but which he deserted in Trop. 
All this may mean that Whittaker's position in future cases in 
this area will be somewhat speculative. 
E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
The arguments for finding expatriation a cruel and unusual 
punishment have been set out thoroughly elsewhere and little 
would be gained by repeating them here.89 Two observations will 
perhaps be helpful, however. The first is in relation to the dis-
sent's opposition to this holding in Trop by the majority opinion. 
Frankfurter there observes, 
"It seems scarcely arguable that loss of citizenship is 
within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition because dis-
proportionate to an offence that is capital and has been so 
from the first year of Independence. Is constitutional dialec-
tic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that 
loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?"00 
Arguably, his rhetorical question is irrelevant. The problem is 
not disproportionateness (although in some cases it may be)91 
but whether the punishment is "cruel and unusual." A punish-
ment might well be the latter and still not be disproportionate. 
For example, if one convicted of murder were sentenced to have 
his ears cut off as his sole punishment, it could hardly be con-
tended that this punishment would be disproportionate-it would 
be lenient-but surely no one would doubt that it would also 
be "cruel and unusual." Frankfurter makes another point that 
is open to scrutiny: 
"If loss of citizenship may constitutionally be made 
the consequence of such conduct as marrying a foreigner, 
and thus certainly not 'cruel and unusual,' it seems more 
than incongruous that such loss should be thought 'cruel 
ss This, of course, would not be true under the analysis made of tbe Frankfurter 
approach, part III, B supra. 
89 64 YALE L. J. Il64 at 1187-Il94 (1955). 
90 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 125 (1958). 
91 E.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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and unusual' when it is the consequence of conduct that is 
also a crime."92 
Is this the point, or is not the point rather that the Eighth 
Amendment deals only with "cruel and unusual punishments," 
and that by its terms it simply is not applicable until a "punish-
ment" is found? It is at least arguable that denationalization of 
the woman who voted in a Canadian local-option election93 was 
cruel and unusual in a meaningful sense, but that her difficulty 
was that she must have proceeded under the Fifth Amendment's 
due process clause, if :at all. 
This introduces the second observation. It would seem that 
some sanctions are inherently penal, regardless of the guise in 
which they may appear. Thus, surely few would contend that 
a death sentence was anything but a "punishment" within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The same argument could 
be made as to long prison terms. 94 The argument would then run 
that denationalization, termed a "drastic" consequence by Frank-
furter in his concurring opinion in Nishikawa, was sufficiently 
severe, as well as arbitrary and capriciaus,95 to warrant being 
classified as per se a criminal sanction. Since the Warren opinion 
in Trap did not limit its finding of a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the crime of desertion, forfeiture would seem 
always to violate the Eighth Amendment when used as punish-
ment.96 The result would be, of course, that denationalization 
would be limited to cases where the act evidenced a change of 
allegiance. No justice took this approach, but it would not seem 
wholly frivolous. 
F. Brennan's Position 
Since Justice Brennan's switch from supporting the govern-
ment in Perez to supporting the petitioner in Trap caused sec-
92 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 126 (1958). 
93 See Roche, "The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory 
Expatriation," 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 25 at 54, note 164 (1950). 
94 Imprisonment for civil contempt, though it could conceivably encompass many 
years, would not seem to mitigate against this argument, for there imprisonment is to 
compel future action rather than to punish past action. 
95 Conceivably, denationalization could mean deportation leading to the status of a 
political criminal in one case, and resulting in no inconvenience at all in another. 
96 It might be argued that denationalization would not be "cruel and unusual" when 
applied to one convicted of treason, but since treason would seem clearly to show a 
"dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment of citizen• 
ship," denationalization could better be applied on that wholly separate ground. 
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tion 40l(e) to be upheld while 40l(g) was found unconstitutional, 
his opinion is of particular interest. He argued (I) that dena-
tionalization was penal, (2) that under the war power Congress 
could deal with desertion, (3) that denationalization bears no ra-
tional relation to rehabilitation for it makes the deserter "an out-
cast," (4) that it does not deter since the death penalty applies to 
desertion and is more severe, (5) that it is capricious, since it 
applies to technical desertions, such as "deserting" to the front 
in order to fight, which bear no relation to failure to bear arms 
for your country. All but the fourth point seem to follow. The 
difficulty with his argument there is that while the death penalty 
was available,97 it was seldom imposed;98 and this was undoubt-
edly common knowledge among the troops. It is therefore per-
fectly conceivable that the possibility of a five-year prison term 
in the United States would be very welcome to a morally weak 
soldier who felt he faced almost certain death in an impending 
battle in a Pacific island jungle. Yet, might not Congress ration-
ally suppose that, were such a soldier also to face automatic loss 
of citizenship on conviction of desertion with its vague connota-
tions of banishment and statelessness, the likelihood of his de-
serting might be lessened? This would at least seem to be per-
missible reasoning within the Frankfurter rationale, and in fact 
four. of the five justices who comprised the majority in Perez 
were so persuaded. 
The status of Brennan's argument is interesting to consider 
in view of the treatment of the point in the Warren opinion. 
He stated: 
"Section 40 I (g) is a penal law, and we must face the 
question whether the Constitution permits the Congress 
to take away citizenship as a punishment for crime. If it is 
assumed that the power of Congress extends to divestment 
of citizenship, the problem still remains as to this statute 
whether denationalization is a cruel and unusual punish-
ment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment."99 
No other reference to this point upon which Brennan rested 
his decision is found in the opinion. Perhaps nothing can be 
97 See Art. 85, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 7OA Stat. 67 (1956), 10 U.S.C. (Supp. 
V, 1958) §885. 
98 See HUIE, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK 6-12 (1954). 
99 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 99 (1958). 
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said, without givmg way to pure conjecture, other than that 
Warren did not find it necessary to reach this point.100 One 
factor does stand out, however. That is that the holding in Trop 
does not command any majority rationale. The result was reached 
only as a result of the combination of two minorities. This must 
be contrasted with Perez where Frankfurter did speak for a 
majority, so that, if the dissenters there are willing to accept 
Perez as a basis for stare decisis, its "rational nexus" approach 
must be regarded as stating the law. 
G. Black's Concurring Opinion in Nishikawa 
Why Justice Black put what are presumably his true views 
as to the constitutional issues raised in an opinion which turned 
solely on burden of proof is difficult to understand. Perhaps he 
wanted to avoid their possible divisive influence in Perez and 
Trop where they would have been relevant. At any rate they 
seem in line with his somewhat doctrinaire stand for the individ-
ual in all Bill of Rights cases. His argument is certainly not un-
supportable. The entire controversy culminating in the 1868 
act was concerned with voluntary expatriation by the individual. 
Osborn and Wong Kim Ark support it as does one interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, it is perhaps more 
straightforward than the fiction which Warren must resort to 
in order to reach his position. It would involve, however, over-
ruling at least two precedents, and it strongly asserts judicial 
intervention. 
H. The Future of Section 401(j) 
The remand of Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey "for determina-
tion in light of Trop v. Dulles" is somewhat surprising since 
Trop did not deal with section 40 l (j) and since its status was 
expressly left open in Perez. Some dictum in Trop does bear 
adversely on section 40l(j)'s constitutionality, however. 
"[Section 40l(g)] is essentially like Section 40l(j) of the 
Nationality Act, decreeing loss of citizenship for evading 
100 On the other hand, since Justice Brennan did not reach the "cruel and unusual 
punishment" question, his vote will be decisive if the question is raised subsequently 
under a section involving "punishment" which bears a reasonable relationship to the 
exercise of a substantive power. 
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the draft by remaining outside the United States. This pro-
vision was also before the Court in Perez, but the majority 
declined to consider its validity. While Section 40l(j) de-
crees loss of citizenship without providing any semblance 
of procedural due process whereby the guilt of the draft 
evader may be determined before the sanction is imposed, 
Section 40l(g), the provision in this case, accords the ac-
cused deserter at least the safeguards of an adjudication of 
guilt by a court-martial."101 
While this observation about section 40l(j) is factually true, 
it should be noted that in Mendoza-Martinez the Immigration 
and Nationality Service started deportation proceedings only 
after petitioner had been convicted of draft evasion.102 The 
remand could have several meanings. Perhaps the most probable 
is that the district court was expected to determine if the sanc-
tion was also penal as in Trop. The purpose of the remand may 
be to determine more facts to see if the absence would show 
a transfer of allegiance within Warren's test, which Frankfurter 
would also accept as an additional ground for denationalization. 
It might be to determine simply what was suggested in the 
quoted dictum-whether petitioner had had a fair hearing on the 
charge of departing the country to avoid military service-al-
though this seems improbable in view of his conviction. The 
section might raise a problem if interpreted both to be penal 
so that the Eighth Amendment applied,1°3 and also to involve 
a transfer of allegiance. It would seem that the Court could per-
missibly ignore the section to the extent it was a penal statute 
and yet denationalize the individual under the section on the 
wholly separate ground that his conduct showed a transfer of 
allegiance. 
101 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 94 (1958). 
102 Note 14 supra. That statute, however, attaches criminality to any person "who 
shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duties," while §401G) and its successor, 
§349(a)(l0) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [66 Stat. 267-268] apply to 
persons who depart from or remain outside the United States "for the purpose of evading 
or avoiding training and service in the military .... " Since one could conceivably "know-
ingly fail" to register for the draft while outside the United States and yet remain outside 
the United States for a "purpose" wholly apart from avoiding military service, conviction 
under the first statute would not necessarily bring the individual under §401G). Compare 
generally Ward v. United States, (5th, Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 441, revd. 344 U.S. 924 (1953), 
with Vidales v. Brownell, (9th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 136, and Gonzales v. Landon, (9th 
Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 955, revd. 350 U.S. 920 (1955). 
103 See note 100 supra. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In assessing these cases, it is difficult to disassociate the ques-
tion of judicial abstention versus judicial intervention from 
the substantive constitutional questions. As an original proposi-
tion, the nature of the early controversies, the debates in 1818, 
the decisions in Osborn and Wong Kim Ark, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the inconclusiveness of Mackenzie and Savorgnan, 
the failure of any statute until 1940 to provide unequivocally 
for involuntary denationalization and the undesirability of state-
lessness104 make the Warren position in Perez preferable. Never-
theless, it can be argued that considerations of judicial policy 
and of the proper relation of the Court to Congress properly 
dictated the opposite result. Were only a degree question-one 
of more or less-involved, the argument would be persuasive. 
Here, however, differing constitutional theories were at stake: 
is expatriation a regulatory technique which need bear only a 
rational relationship to the exercise of a substantive power; or 
is expatriation itself a substantive power requiring its own con-
stitutional basis for exercise, failing which it can only be ap-
plied when the individual's acts approach voluntary expatriation. 
This being true, it would seem that the Court could have ac-
cepted the latter constitutional position without being charged 
with disregarding "the constitutional allocation of governmental 
functions." 
Robert ]. Hoerner, S.Ed. 
104 See generally SECKLER-HUDSON, STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
UNITED STATES (1934); WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 
(1956). 
